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Abstract 
Brexit could be seen as the largest popular rebellion against the power elites in the UK 
modern history. It is also part of a larger phenomenon – the resurgence of nationalism 
and right-wing politics within Europe, the United States and beyond. Bringing in its 
wake the worrying manifestations of racism, xenophobia and anti-intellectualism, 
Brexit and its consequences should be a core concern for Critical Management Studies 
academics in helping to shape post-Brexit societies, organisations and workplaces, and 
in fighting and challenging the sinister forces that permeate them. In this paper, we 
consider how CMS can rise to the challenges and possibilities of this ‘phenomenon-in-
the-making’. We reflect on the intellectual tools available to CMS researchers and the 
ways in which they may be suited to this task. In particular, we explore how the key 
positions of anti-performativity, critical performativity, political performativity, and 
public CMS can be used as a starting point for thinking about the potential relevance of 
CMS in Brexit and post-Brexit contexts. Our intention is to encourage CMS-ers to 
contribute positively to the post-Brexit world in academic as well as personal capacities. 
For this, we argue that a new public CMS is needed, which would 1) be guided by the 
premise that we have no greater and no lesser right than anyone else to shape the 
world, 2) entail as much critical reflexivity in relation to our unintended 
performativities as our intended ones, and 3) be underpinned by marginalism as a 
critical political project. 
 (244 words) 
Keywords: Brexit, populism, racism, anti-intellectualism, public CMS, marginalism, 
unintended performativity. 
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Brexiting CMS 
 
Introduction 
Brexit is a complex and contradictory phenomenon-in-the-making, capable of 
transforming social, economic, political, legal, cultural and organisational norms not 
only within the UK but also on the broader international stage. Bringing together 
unlikely allies (from Lexiteers to proponents of the far right) and further dividing 
established groups and parties, it involves a broad spectrum of supporters and 
opposition (Davidson, 2017). As media reports and emerging academic commentaries 
struggle to make sense of this complexity, several themes begin to unfold. Firstly, Brexit 
could be seen as the largest popular rebellion against the power elites in the UK modern 
history. Secondly, political complexity notwithstanding, it is linked to the larger 
phenomenon of the resurgence of nationalism and right-wing politics within Europe, 
the United States and beyond. Thirdly, at least some of the events preceding and 
subsequent to the Brexit vote, such as the increased manifestations of racism, 
xenophobia and anti-intellectualism, are deeply worrying and require urgent critical 
scrutiny and opposition.  
In this paper, based on the above points we argue that Brexit should be a core concern 
for Critical Management Studies academics in helping to shape post-Brexit societies, 
organisations and workplaces, and in fighting and challenging the sinister forces that 
permeate them. Following a brief overview of the background and unfolding 
consequences of the Brexit vote, we consider how CMS can interrogate the challenges 
and possibilities of this phenomenon-in-the-making. In so doing, we reflect on the 
intellectual tools available to CMS researchers and the ways in which they may be suited 
to this task. In particular, we explore how the key positions of anti-performativity, 
critical performativity, political performativity, and public CMS can be used as a starting 
point for thinking about the potential relevance of CMS in Brexit and post-Brexit 
contexts. Our intention is to encourage a wide spectrum of CMS-ers to contribute 
positively to shaping Brexit and post-Brexit worlds in academic as well as personal 
capacities. For this, we argue that a new public CMS is needed, which would be guided 
by the premise that we have as much and as little right as anyone else to shape the 
world, entail critical reflexivity in relation to our unintended as well as intended 
performativities, and be underpinned by marginalism as a critical political project. 
Background and Consequences 
On the 23rd of June 2016 the electorate of the United Kingdom voted by a slim majority 
to leave the European Union, setting the course for what has become known as ‘Brexit’. 
However, Scotland, Northern Ireland, London and most metropolitan areas voted to 
remain. This momentous event has been called the largest popular rebellion against ‘the 
establishment’ (in the broad sense of ‘power elites’) within the UK in modern history. In 
particular, it has been described as a dramatic (and traumatic) comeback of those 
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groups and sections of the population most affected (and disaffected) by the worst of 
the austerity measures (Wahl, 2016; Worth, 2016) instituted in pursuit of neoliberal 
ideals of market fundamentalism (Pettifor, 2016). The shock waves generated by Brexit 
stretch to political, economic, institutional and organisational turbulence, provoking 
both utopianism and anxiety and fear, as the enormity of the impact on individuals, 
organisations, institutions and nations starts to unfold. The Brexit vote can be seen as a 
‘moment of suspended disbelief’, creating a discontinuity where previous norms and 
rules of engagement no longer automatically apply, and where earlier accepted values 
and practices are up for negotiation (Guldi, 2016). Britain is poised in the balance 
between a multiplicity of conflicting and competing futures – ranging from the 
restoration of welfare state as advocated by the Labour Party Leader, Jeremy Corbyn, to 
further neoliberalisation, darker, more dystopian scenarios (such as the rise of the far 
right to new dominance), and to other, potentially yet unimagined possibilities (ibid.).  
Brexit is still very much a phenomenon-in-the-making – being ‘so polyvalent a notion 
and so complex a process that its present meaning is hard to define and its future 
trajectory hard to discern’ (Jessop, 2016:7). As a conflicted and continuously evolving 
assemblage of politically incongruous allies and interests, it is a daily study in the 
complexities of radical change, the organisation and disorganisation of politics, and the 
political nature of organising and disorganising. With the questions of the unity of the 
United Kingdom and the continuation of the EU very much on the agenda, Brexit is also 
undeniably a phenomenon of global significance (Galbraith, 2016; Patomäki, 2016; 
Wahl, 2016).  
Despite the multiplicity of political motivations driving it, Brexit has been widely 
reported to have given a boost to populist parties on both sides of the Atlantic and 
contributed to the Trump vote in the US presidential election on the 8th of November 
2016. Along with ‘Trumpism’, Brexit has been interpreted as the first stark evidence to 
the claim that Europe and USA are now under an unprecedented sway of a new, 
‘heritage’ form of right-wing populism (Reynié, 2016). This new form of populism is 
said to emphasise the nativist preservation of material and cultural heritage and is 
characterised by ‘unbridled demagoguery, xenophobia, condemnation of the elite, and 
stigmatizing rhetoric’ (Reynié, 2016: 48). It exploits and is fuelled by anger and anxiety 
of those most disadvantaged by the West’s growing economic inequality in the context 
of globalization and neoliberal austerity policies, and of those lashing back at the rapid 
progressive cultural erosion of traditional norms, privileges and status in the context of 
multiculturalism and liberalism (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Zakaria, 2016). As right-
wing populist parties continue to gain ground within and beyond Europe, there remains 
a foreboding that ‘any minute now we could be living in a very different world’ 
(Williams-Grut, 2016, see also Giroux, 2016). As a sign of its times as well as a radical 
political event in its own right, Brexit and its consequences are thus in need of urgent 
critical examination. 
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One of the most apparent and shocking features in the wake of the Brexit vote has been 
the surge in hatred attacks, including those engendering racism, xenophobia, and 
homophobia, with some media reporting as much as a 147% rise in July, August and 
September 2016 following the June referendum (Lusher, 2016). Although racism, 
xenophobia and associated behaviour have always been present in the British society, 
Brexit seems to have legitimised the expression of belief in their legitimacy (Stewart, 
2016), showing Britain as deeply divided along the lines of not only race and nationality, 
but also age, class, education, regional differences and urbanisation (Hobolt, 2016; Toly, 
2016; Worth, 2016). The violence unleashed as a result has found manifold expression 
on British streets, public transport, social media and in workplaces in the form of daily 
written, verbal and physical abuse of those looking or sounding foreign, and in more 
serious attacks, including the brutal murders of MP Jo Cox and Polish worker Arkadiusz 
Jóźwik. Conversely, anti-racist and anti-hatred campaigns and movements, such as the 
#SafetyPin campaign, the Avaaz ‘Reject Racism’ campaign and Not Foreign (which has 
collected more than 10,000 signatures to their open letter to the Prime Minister calling 
on her ‘to put a stop to her government’s bitter, racist and divisive language’) point to 
the consolidation of forces rising to oppose the hatred surge. 
As well as stirring up the murky waters of hatred, Brexit has also been blamed for 
breeding what the press has been swift to describe as ‘a sinister strain of anti-
intellectualism’ (Wright, 2016). The role of experts and intellectuals has been spurned 
and ridiculed by some politicians – most notoriously when as part of the Leave 
campaign Michael Gove was reported by the media as refusing to name any economists 
supporting Brexit, stating instead that ‘people in this country have had enough of 
experts’ (Mance 2016). Leading figures in Brexit debates, and especially Leave 
campaigners, have been said to take unprecedented liberties with facts in general and 
referendum promises in particular. In return, the anti-‘anti-science’ backlash seems to 
have been quick off the mark, with the labels of ‘postmodern politics’ freely attributed 
to the Leave campaign and the government’s management of Brexit, along with 
accusations of denials of the existence of ‘objective truth’ and permitting ‘relativism to 
let rip and damn the consequences’ (Wright, 2016). The editors of Oxford Dictionaries 
named ‘post-truth’ (‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are 
less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’) 
the word of the year in 2016, based on the 2,000% surge in the use of the word in 2016 
compared to 2015. The surge peaked around the EU Referendum and the US 
presidential election (Flood, 2016). Brexit can thus be understood not only as the latest 
flare-up in the 200-year struggle between the expert-led state rule and the participatory 
democracy (Guldi, 2016), but also arguably as the latest salvo of the long-standing 
‘science wars’ (Sardar, 2000) playing out in the broad political arena. 
The questions over the legitimacy and relevance of experts and the nature of their 
knowledge make Brexit a core concern for academics in terms of reflecting on our own 
knowledge, practice, impact and relevance. Added to this are concerns over our 
workplaces. The consequences of Brexit for UK universities are manifold, as many of us 
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question the possibility and expediency of following academic careers in the UK, 
European funding starts to be curtailed, the flow of European students starts to shrink, 
and European academic links and partnerships become harder to forge (Cressey, 
2017). Yet, as academics, we face the challenging task of not only living and working 
through Brexit, but also making sense of it as a phenomenon, of influencing policy and 
public opinion during and after Brexit negotiations, and of questioning and reinventing 
what we research and who and how we teach in Brexit and post-Brexit times. Fournier 
and Smith (2012) point out that reward systems in universities discourage academics 
from making a difference in the wider community by creating a conflict between public 
and individual interests and privileging the latter. So in addressing Brexit and the 
broader phenomenon of populism we have the added challenge of ensuring that the 
imperative to protect our professional interests vested in academic careers in local HE 
institutions does not replace the need for a broader and deeper reimagining of our 
practice as researchers and educators, and – conversely – for our contribution to 
addressing global issues in which we are seemingly less directly implicated. (The latter, 
we might add, is an illusion that is all too easily maintained (Dunne et al, 2008).) 
Brexit and CMS 
For CMS, as an academic community that studies and questions many of the root 
problems and issues surfaced by Brexit in relation to organising and organisations, now 
is the time to demonstrate its own worth. Armed with its long-honed theoretical tools 
(e.g. theories of leadership, change, power, resistance, race and class), critical 
methodologies and epistemologies, as well as developed critiques of elites, 
neoliberalism, market fundamentalism, managerialism and economic inequalities, CMS 
is potentially well-prepared to confront the organisational and societal aspects of Brexit, 
its impact on working lives, and its implications for the role of researchers, educators 
and intellectuals. Now is the time to put these arms to the test in the context of radical 
political upheaval in order to establish what can help to foster constructive debate, 
challenge deep underlying racism, class, regional and other tensions, and dissipate the 
damaging effects of Brexit whilst helping to grasp the moment of potentialities it 
represents for building alternative futures and societies. On the other hand, it is also 
time to examine what within our intellectual arsenal is found wanting, or, indeed, 
absent. This is a particularly worthwhile task as Brexit and post-Brexit trade deals 
negotiations could go on for a decade (Elgot et al, 2016) and therefore are likely to be 
impacting professional and personal lives both within and outside the UK for a very long 
time. This also gives CMS time and opportunity to contribute to policy development 
moving forward. 
Confronting Brexit would, however, require confronting CMS itself in some rather 
fundamental ways. As Tatli (2012) writes, CMS specializes in spotting and challenging 
exclusion and privilege in management and organising at large, but is often blind to the 
pervasive inequality, homogeneity and exclusion within its own ranks. This, in turn, 
sabotages its critical potential, for ‘how can a community which is characterized by the 
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numerical and hierarchical domination of the privileged segments of society provide 
alternatives for the disadvantaged and oppressed?’ (Tatli, 2012: 26). Tatli’s argument is 
now particularly poignant in the context in which the disadvantaged and oppressed 
have apparently had enough of (academic) experts who are likely to be seen as part of 
the oppressing and uncaring elite. To demonstrate its relevance in the context of Brexit 
and rising heritage populism, it is therefore vital that CMS learns to apply the same 
critical scrutiny to ourselves as we do to others, and to act on such critical reflection to 
instill diversity and inclusion within our own community. This links to the broader need 
for CMS to become more thorough and inventive about bridging the distance between 
itself and the disenfranchised whose interests it purports to support. 
 It is not just the elitism and exclusivity of CMS that are problematic in light of this need. 
The political, intellectual and practical focus of CMS requires re-examining and refining 
too.  Back in 2008, in a Speaking Out issue of this journal on the future of CMS, Stookey 
wrote about the tension between the elitism inherent in CMS (and which ‘reserves 
authority for those individuals and groups with special attributes, for that which is 
specifically not common’) and the CMS scholars’ populist affinities – i.e. the privileging 
within CMS of ‘the characteristics, interests, ideas and leadership of the majority’. 
Stookey called on CMS-ers to denounce eliticism whilst openly acknowledging its 
inevitable role in the CMS’ populist project, arguing that no meaningful change was 
possible ‘unless guided by the common experience of the majority’ (Stookey, 2008). Ten 
years on, the darker aspects of Brexit have cast the entanglement between CMS, 
populism and elitism in a new dour light. The surge of hatred and xenophobia are a 
poignant reminder of populism’s ugly side, that ‘meaningful change guided by common 
experience’ does not necessarily mean change for the better, and that privileging the 
interests and ideals of the majority (even if this were feasible in the case of Brexit, 
where ‘majority’ and its motivations are so loosely defined and demographically 
complex) comes with the long historical shadow of too high a price too often paid by the 
minorities whose interests and ideas are thereby excluded.  
In this new light, CMS needs to question and reexamine its populist affinities. This 
would involve asking whether it is indeed the majority interests that we wish to support 
and further through our work, or whether there are better ways of focusing the 
energies. We come back to this point later on in the paper. The relationship between 
CMS and populism needs to be reexamined especially as, in bringing to the surface the 
mistrust and questioning of the elites, neoliberalism, market fundamentalism and 
globalization, Brexit has both, in a way, embodied aspects of CMS critique and sabotaged 
it. It has done the latter not least through the questioning of the relevance of the 
academic elite and expertise on which CMS draws for legitimacy. It is therefore also the 
time to revisit and reassess the question of the relevance of CMS and its impact on the 
broader populace it aspires to serve.  
CMS communities should be well prepared for such self-examination due to their long-
standing claims to reflexivity and debates over their relevance to practitioners. Since 
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the turn of the millennium, such debates have been framed mostly in terms of different 
key positions in relation to the notion of performativity – including, specifically, anti-
performativity (Fournier and Grey, 2000), critical or progressive performativity (Spicer 
et al, 2009; Alvesson and Spicer, 2012; Spicer et al, 2016; Wickert and Schaefer, 2015), 
and political performativity (Cabantous et al, 2016). More recently, they have also been 
framed as calls for a more public CMS (Fleming and Banerjee, 2016; Delbridge, 2014), 
engaged scholarship (Cunliffe and Scaratti, 2017) and intellectual/academic activism 
(Contu, 2017; Pritchard and Benschop, 2017; Rhoades et al, 2017).  Below, we therefore 
take these positions as a starting point for thinking about the potential relevance of CMS 
in Brexit and post-Brexit contexts. We reflect on the potential and the challenges 
associated with each position, and argue that there is a need for a new public CMS, 
which would 1) be guided by the premise that we have no greater and no lesser right 
than anyone else to shape the world, 2) entail as much critical reflexivity in relation to 
our unintended performativities as our intended ones, and 3) be underpinned by 
marginalism as a critical political project. 
Anti-performativity 
The anti-performative (or non-performative) stance, put forward by Fournier and Grey 
(2000) as one of the key features that unifies diverse CMS endeavors, is about 
questioning the managerialist subordination of knowledge, research and learning to the 
goals of economic efficiency. It is also about challenging the mainstream assumption 
that the purpose of management research and education is to contribute to the 
effectiveness of managerial practice. As ‘opposition to forms of knowledge exclusively 
serving economic efficiency’ (Cabantous et al, 2016: 200), anti-performativity is in some 
ways aligned with the spirit of heritage populism that openly disdains economic 
expertise and facts. This alignment arguably presents CMS with an opportunity to 
inform the efforts to denaturalize and deconstruct old institutions of inequality and 
repression in the process of Brexit. Anti-performativity can also be instrumental in 
making sense of how Brexit and its consequences came about, through analysis of the 
alienation and disenchantment of segments of the populace with the dehumanizing 
tyranny of neoliberal economic fundamentalism. Furthermore, with its inherent anti-
managerialism, anti-performativity can act as a timely imperative ‘to free the notion of 
[CMS] engagement from the straightjacket within which it has become trapped by 
debates promoting or refusing dialogue with managers, and re-imagine engagement in 
terms of a broader organizational constituency’ (Fournier and Grey, 2000: 27). On the 
other hand, as populism rises to dominance, anti-performativity is in danger of 
becoming abused as a discursive weapon in the arsenal of the powerful. The notion of 
‘anti-establishment’ (repurposed in relation to heritage populism) suddenly, ironically, 
threatens to become an establishment itself, and acquires darker and more menacing 
undertones. The CMS ‘anti-‘focus – the vector of its critique – on economic 
performativity, whilst valuable, potentially risks becoming too narrow to grapple with 
the organisational complexities in the wake of this political change.  
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Critical or Progressive Performativity 
The assertion that CMS should be profoundly performative, in the sense of having as its 
central task active and pragmatic intervention in specific debates about management 
and encouraging progressive forms of management (Spicer et al, 2009), arguably fits 
rather comfortably with the idea that CMS should be actively contributing to the efforts 
to re-organise and repair during and after Brexit. Moreover, as a rapidly evolving set of 
‘unresolved issues, challenges, contentions or concerns that exist but are not clearly 
articulated’ (Spicer et al, 2016: 234), that are of utmost public importance and in urgent 
need of reflexive questioning, Brexit constitutes an ideal arena for putting the full 
capacity of critical performativity to the test. More specifically, where it ‘involves CMS 
becoming affirmative, caring, pragmatic, potential focused, and normative’ (Spicer et al, 
2009: 537), critical performativity offers an opportunity to address and mitigate the 
impact of Brexit on organisations, and help to shape organisational reactions to Brexit 
and their consequences. This could involve working constructively with individuals and 
groups within both commercial and non-commercial organisations (such as the 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Developmenti and trade unions) to help dissipate 
Brexit-related tensions in the workplace, address emotions at work, and actively 
challenge racism, xenophobia, and homophobia (for example by questioning underlying 
assumptions about the role of immigrant labour or other minorities in organisations). 
Such engagement could emphasise a role not only for engaged scholarship but also for 
critical management education that extends beyond the classroom. In this, CMS-ers 
could make use of specific tactics associated with critical performativity – in particular, 
searching for potentialities in the present context (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012), engaging 
with non-academic groups using dialectical reasoning, scaling up insights through 
movement building, and propagating deliberation (Spicer et al, 2016) – in order to 
reclaim relevance at a time when detached academic expertise is increasingly 
undermined.  
To make the most of these possibilities, however, the limitations of critical 
performativity must be reflected on and confronted. For example, its goals of micro-
emancipation and micro-engagement ‘to induce incremental, rather than radical, 
changes in managerial behaviour’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2015: 107) – the goals that 
may work their slow effects well in times of relative stability, may prove hopelessly 
unresponsive and inadequate in the context of radical political events (Fleming and 
Banerjee, 2016). Furthermore, the emphasis of critical performativity on the process of 
‘reflexive conscientization’ that aims to slowly raise the critical consciousness of 
practitioners (Wickert and Schaefer, 2015) may require reimagining or at least refining 
in a situation where the lack of critical consciousness is not necessarily the problem. 
Rather, on whatever side individual CMS-ers find themselves in the context that 
exacerbates and normalizes explicit political tensions, the question may now be at least 
as much about the means and the ethics of dealing with the critical consciousness of 
those we attempt to emancipate. The question is especially pressing when that critical 
consciousness is decidedly at odds and perhaps even openly hostile to our own, and 
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bent upon a course that we see as destruction of our own deeply held beliefs, such as 
those of equality, pluralism and openness. In this light, it needs to be acknowledged that 
even the term ‘progressive’ may now provoke additional hostility in more than one way 
due to its resonances with the political defeats of the progressive liberal side.  
Political Performativity 
Political theory of performativity – aka political performativity – was developed to 
‘provide an alternative reading of performativity that better enables efforts to take on 
the issues’ that critical performativity aims to address (Cabantous et al, 2016: 198). In 
the light (and darkness) of Brexit, the core strength of this position is its explicit 
emphasis on performativity as necessitating engagement with power and politics that 
are both embodied in and transcend organisations, as well as its engagement with 
subjectivities, identities, and socio-material arrangements that both constitute and are 
constituted within the broader networks of power (Cabantous et al, 2016). Political 
performativity thus offers CMS an opportunity to respond more fully to the context in 
which ‘big P’ Politics comes to radically disrupt and rearrange organizational practices 
and working lives. In this context, political performativity can be put to work to examine 
how new subjects and identities (e.g. ‘Brexiteers’, ‘Brexiters’, ‘Remainers’, ‘Lexiteers’) 
are constituted as part of Brexit, how subjects and identities are questioned and 
reworked (e.g. ‘experts’, ‘intellectuals’, ‘academics’), how the othering of groups that 
come to be the objects of the hatred surge (e.g. ‘immigrants’) takes place. Political 
performativity has the potential to encourage CMS-ers to expand their focus to examine 
organisations and workplaces as parts of the wider socio-material networks 
constituting and being re-constituted by Brexit. This would involve paying attention not 
only to the impact of Brexit on organisations, but also to the role of organisations and 
organising in shaping Brexit and its consequences. More broadly, it would involve 
investigating the role of the wide range of organisations, institutions, social movements 
and individuals (e.g. media and social media, financial institutions, local, national and 
supranational governments, NGOs, political and business leaders (Grint, 2016), think 
tanks, universities, academics) in shaping and/or failing to shape popular and political 
opinion underpinning heritage populism and its alternatives. The stance of political 
performativity would foster the view of CMS and CMS scholars as actors among many in 
these wider networks of power, and thus as possessing no greater nor lesser a priori 
entitlement to influence and impact the socio-material arrangements of which they are 
part than anyone else. 
New public CMS, unintended performativity, and marginalism 
The ‘no greater nor lesser’ qualifier is important. From the position of assumed elitism 
and expertise, the ‘no greater’ aspect may seem (to an academic) a degrading thought, 
but we would suggest that it is otherwise merely a sobering one – a reminder that CMS 
should claim no higher ground to address problems and shape society in post-Brexit 
context. Too much discussion of CMS performativity seems to assume a privileged 
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intellectual and moral right of critical scholars to intervene or at least critique 
managerial and organisational practice. Yet the recent events have demonstrated very 
clearly that the world is not waiting with baited breath to hear and act on academic 
utterances. Instead, it is up to us to earn and maintain the pragmatic and contingent 
right to change and impact – in the more meaningful sense of developing a ‘public CMS’ 
(Fleming and Banerjee, 2016) perhaps enabled by organic public sociology (Brook and 
Darlington, 2013) and new public social science (Delbridge, 2014) rather than its 
stripped-down, economic efficiency-driven version propagated by the managerialist 
Higher Education. Such right needs to be earned by not only having something 
worthwhile to say and do, but also by speaking and acting in ways that are convincing, 
interesting and engaging to audiences that are ‘not likely to come to the sermon, much 
less be a part of the choir’ (Perrow, 2008: 915). Although we would not advocate 
writing for The Daily Mail,ii we see an urgent need to rework CMS’ engagement with 
politics, policy and community, whilst continuing to develop and enact critical 
scholarship and education.  
There is already much we can draw on – both within CMS and in the wider social 
sciences – to develop this agenda. This would include, firstly, rediscovering and 
reasserting the power of education as activism (Contu, 2009; Delbridge, 2014) whilst 
becoming more inventive about how we take critical education to those who are 
unlikely to become managers (perhaps learning from 1950s-60s British Marxist 
historians and others, who taught adult education, enabled by trade unions and other 
institutional actors). It would also include developing a more extensive arsenal of 
engaged research methodologies aimed at producing socially useful knowledge, in 
which researchers act not as detached ‘experts’ but as dialogue facilitators between 
practitioners (Cunliffe and Scaratti, 2017). To engage with the rise and effects of 
heritage populism, we could learn from past research into similar phenomena – for 
example, 1980s sociological studies of Far Right communities, where researchers took 
the experiences and perspectives of those directly involved in such movements as a 
starting point for critical intervention into the Far Right norms and assumptions. More 
broadly, we can make use of the encouraging new work on intellectual/academic 
activism (Contu, 2017; Rhodes et al, 2017) and new spaces in which it can be made 
visible (including the Acting Up section of this journal (Pritchard and Benschop, 2017)). 
Whatever else we do, we would need to reclaim less masculinized versions of public 
intellectualism, with the aspiration to act not as prominent (or dominant) public 
thinkers/experts imposing views on others from a safe, elevated and distant position, 
but as (embedded and embodied) conduits of understanding (Latin intellectus) – 
interpreters, questioners – within and between communities. 
The ‘no greater right’ element is a reminder that any importance and political advantage 
that we do have derives from our connection to others. In crafting such links we 
construct both our identities and influence, yet as critical scholars we should be mindful 
of the ‘strength in numbers’ adage and the seduction of power. We must choose our 
allies carefully.  Whilst it may be tempting and even seem sensible to ‘work with the 
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enemy’ in order to be critically performative (Delbridge, 2014; Spicer et al, 2009), we 
should be very careful of the ways in which our engagement with those in positions of 
power reproduces the very power structures and elites we wish to challenge and coopts 
our work into their service. This raises the issue of unintended performativity. If we 
acknowledge that CMS and CMS scholars are (inevitably) actors interacting with other 
actors within socio-material networks of power, then it follows that each action we take 
results in some sort of performativity or impact on others. Even if all we ever do is 
disseminate ideas, these ideas have an impact and a fate of their own in the hands of 
other people around us, often to the detriment rather than benefit of others (Dunne et 
al, 2008). Consequently, we need to be vigilant about and ready to combat our 
unintended performativity, especially where CMS work becomes misused and twisted. 
To put it differently, a new public CMS should be radically reflexive not only about the 
public good it aims to achieve but also about the public harm it needs to avoid achieving. 
One case in point is of the notion that postmodernism has paved the way for post-truth 
politics, and that the liberal leftist academia should therefore acknowledge its ‘shameful 
part’ in spawning post-truth and its consequences (Calcutt, 2016). As a home for non-
mainstream approaches, including postmodernism, CMS is clearly implicated in this 
argument. Yet this is arguably a case of postmodernist thought twisted in the service of 
heritage populism. For example, there is a vast difference between examining and 
questioning the power dynamics and assumptions sustaining (dominant) truth claims 
(something for which postmodernism is very useful) and the post-truth claims that 
(inconvenient) facts are irrelevant. There is therefore intellectual and political work cut 
out for CMS-ers here to draw out the differences and their moral consequences 
(perhaps even applying postmodernism to deconstruct post-truth as an emerging 
grand-narrative!). 
Returning to the challenge of choosing our allies carefully and the issue of the 
entanglement of CMS scholars with populism and elitism, we suggest that marginalism 
might be a more promising direction as the CMS political project. Rather than pandering 
to the wishes of the majority, heedless of whatever its stampede might leave trampled 
underfoot, or bowing to the superiority of elites, however indifferent they may be to the 
fates of those seen as insignificant, marginalism would involve a responsibility towards 
the underdog, the excluded, the forgotten. It would involve picking up the pieces of what 
has been washed up, broken and pitiful, on the shore; and engaging with the voices too 
quietly dissonant amidst the confident choir of the majority. Here we could take 
inspiration from the organic public sociology and strive to ‘extend and deepen our 
organic engagement with the organized, unorganized, marginalized and unwaged, 
whether they are in overt struggle or searching for their voices to be heard, as a first 
step in pursuing social change’ (Brook and Darlington, 2013: 214). Marginalism would 
also mean that CMS takes up a permanently relative, semiotic position, always directing 
its critique against the dominant vectors of power, whichever way they may be pushing 
society. A change in the direction of such vectors – and in the shape of the margins they 
create – would imply a corresponding change in the vectors of critique, and a sensitive 
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search for the new marginalized. The underdogs of the pre-Brexit context may or may 
not be the same today, and this needs to be carefully explored. 
We suggest that marginalism would mean that our search for the underdogs should also 
guide our search for allies – in other words, our ‘natural’ allies should be those on the 
margins of every sphere, organization, location and walk of life. Perhaps we should start 
by looking for the oppressed, excluded and marginalized within our own ranks and ask 
how such ‘CMS underdogs’ could help us address the inequalities, marginalization and 
exclusion within our own practices, and whether, working collaboratively, they would 
be willing to act as connections to those whom we normally struggle to reach outside 
academia. In the broader context, we should also learn from and engage with emerging 
resistances – for instance, social movements and campaigning organisations like Avaaz, 
who are very effective at identifying social, political and economic problems around the 
world and mobilizing fast response action through a combination of digital, offline, local 
and global resources. Conversely, a greater challenge could be to dare go where 
resistance produces its own social injustice – where the oppressed oppress, and 
marginalised marginalize others (think racism, hatred and xenophobia attacks in the 
context of heritage populism), and also where power comes so close to domination (in 
Foucaldian sense) that resistance is all but absent. Whilst finding such blind spots and 
engaging with the silent voices they may conceal is likely to be difficult, CMS is relatively 
well-equipped to do so with its long-standing work on different forms of power and 
resistance, and approaches for focusing on the hidden dark side (e.g. postmodernist 
emphasis on the absent present). From the marginalist perspective, the really 
challenging aspect would be to ensure that our configuration of allies remains dynamic 
and contingent to reflect the changing power relations and to resist the temptation to 
settle permanently into familiar networks, drifting together towards more comfortable 
positions. 
Concluding thoughts 
The ‘no lesser right’ element should act as an encouragement. We have no less pre-given 
right and no less a priori responsibility to speak and be heard, to critique, to care, to 
feel, to uproot, to repair, to defend and to change than anyone else. Our hope is that in 
taking up this right and responsibility at this time of great uncertainty and upheaval, 
and in putting to the test thoughts and ideas both established and new, CMS-ers of all 
kinds of walks and persuasions can contribute positively to shaping Brexit and post-
Brexit worlds in academic as well as personal capacities. Given the global nature and 
complexity of Brexit and heritage populism as phenomena, doing so is likely to require 
working across disciplines and geographical locations, and diverse contributions – 
including new, inventive forms – from different kinds of academic, scholarly, political 
and practitioner activities, and from a broad range of approaches and methodologies. It 
is likely to need engaged, public critical education and scholarship enabled by broader 
intellectual activism (Contu, 2017) (with awareness of our intended and unintended 
performativities), including active, reflexive engagement with both traditional and 
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social media, and critical contribution to policy and political campaigns (Brook and 
Darlington, 2013; Fleming and Banerjee, 2016). It is also likely to need a critical re-
evaluation of a number of long-standing debates, e.g. about post-industrial society, the 
profit imperative, ecological responsibility, patriarchy, feminism and masculinities, 
symbolic violence, migration and work, global value chains, intellectual pluralism, 
equality and human rights, and alternatives to populism and austerity. Additionally, it 
would also require an ongoing sponsorship of newly emerging debates such as the role 
of the journalistic field and social media in populist movements, the role of emotions 
and affect in research, and ongoing work on developing the role of researchers as 
activists. 
Such effort may well begin to unfold new forms of public performativity. Brexit is a 
wake-up call – we hope it can act as an impetus for a positive transformative change 
within and beyond CMS.  
References 
Alvesson, M. and Spicer, A. (2012) ‘Critical leadership studies: The case for critical 
performativity’, Human Relations, 65/(3): 367–390. 
Brook, P. and Darlington, R. (2013) ‘Partisan, scholarly and active: arguments for an 
organic public sociology of work’, Work, Employment and Society, 27(2) 232–243. 
Cabantous, L. Gond, J.-P., Harding, N. and Learmonth, M. (2016). ‘Critical Essay: 
Reconsidering critical performativity’, Human Relations, 69(2): 197–213. 
Calcutt, A. (2016) ‘The surprising origins of ‘post-truth’ – and how it was spawned by 
the liberal left’, The Conversation, November 18, https://theconversation.com/the-
surprising-origins-of-post-truth-and-how-it-was-spawned-by-the-liberal-left-68929  
Contu, A. (2017) ‘… The point is to change it’ – Yes, but in what direction and how? 
Intellectual activism as a way of ‘walking the talk’ of critical work in business schools’, 
Organization, OnlineFirst, November 16. 
Contu, A. (2009) ‘Critical management education’, In Alvesson, M., Bridgman, T. and 
Willmott, H. (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 536–50.   
Cressey, D. (2017) Brexit vote drives UK academics to think about leaving, Nature, 9th 
January 2017. 
Cunliffe. A.L. and Scaratti. G. (2017) ‘Embedding Impact in Engaged Research: 
Developing Socially Useful Knowledge through Dialogical Sensemaking’, British Journal 
of Management, Vol 28(1), pp. 29-44. 
Delbridge, R. (2014) Promising Futures: CMS, Post-Disciplinarity, and the New Public 
Social Science, Journal of Management Studies, 51(1): 95-117.  
 14 
Davidson, N. (2017) Why have there been so few protests against Brexit? The 
Conversation, 31st March 2017. 
Dunne, S., Harney, S. and Parker, M. (2008) ‘The Responsibilities of Management 
Intellectuals: A Survey’, Organization, 15(2): 271-282. 
Elgot, J., Mason, R., and Rankin, J. (2016) EU politicians believe trade deal could take 
decade, No. 10 is warned, The Guardian, 15th December 2016. 
Fleming, P. and Banerjee, S.B. (2016) When performativity fails: Implications for Critical 
Management Studies, Human Relations, 69(2): 257–276. 
Flood, A. (2016) 'Post-truth' named word of the year by Oxford Dictionaries, The 
Guardian, 15th November 2016. 
Fournier, V. and Grey, C. (2000) ‘At the Critical Moment: Conditions and Prospects for 
Critical Management Studies’, Human Relations, 53(1): 7–32. 
Fournier, V. and Smith, W. (2012) ‘Making choice, taking risk: On the coming out of 
Critical Management Studies’, Ephemera, 12(4): 463-474. 
Galbraith, G. (2016): Europe and the World after Brexit, Globalizations, DOI: 
10.1080/14747731.2016.1228781  
Giroux, H. (2016): Political Frauds, Donald Trump, and the Ghost of Totalitarianism, 
Knowledge Cultures, 4(5): 95-108. 
Grint, K. (2016) Dirty Hands and Clean Heels: 21 days of political leadership in the UK 
Leadership12(5): 564-580 
Guldi, J. (2016): The Case for Utopia: History and the Possible Meanings of Brexit a 
Hundred Years On, Globalizations, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2016.1228782  
Hobolt, S.B. (2016) The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 23:9, 1259-1277, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1225785  
Inglehart, R.F. and Norris, P. (2016): Trump, Brexit, and the rise of Populism: Economic 
have-nots and cultural backlash, HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/Index.aspx 
Jessop, B. (2016): The Organic Crisis of the British State: Putting Brexit in its Place, 
Globalizations, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2016.1228783   
Lusher, A. (2016): Homophobic attacks rose 147 per cent after the Brexit vote: New 
figures suggest that the rise in hate crime seen after the EU referendum wasn't just 
confined to racism or Islamophobia, Independent, 9th October 2016, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-hate-crime-hatred-
homophobia-lgbt-147-per-cent-rise-double-attacks-on-gays-lesbians-a7352411.html 
 15 
Mance, H. (2016) Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove. Financial Times, 3rd June 
2016 
Martinson, J. (2016) Daily Mail backs Brexit in EU referendum. The Guardian, 21st June 
2016 
Pasha-Robinson, L. (2017) Marine Le Pen establishes lead in first round French election 
poll. The Independent, 12th January 2017. 
Patomäki, H. (2016): Will the EU Disintegrate? What Does the Likely Possibility of 
Disintegration Tell About the Future of the World?, Globalizations, DOI: 
10.1080/14747731.2016.1228786  
Perrow, C. (2008): Conservative Radicalism, Organization, 15(6): 915–921. 
Pettifor, A. (2016): Brexit and its Consequences, Globalizations, DOI: 
10.1080/14747731.2016.1229953  
Pritchard, C. and Benschop, Y. (2017) ‘It’s time for Acting Up!’, Organization, OnlineFirst, 
December 15. 
Reynié, D. (2016): “Heritage Populism” and France’s National Front, Journal of 
Democracy, 28(4): 47-57. 
Rhoades, C., Wright, C. and Pullen, A. (2017): ‘Changing the world? The politics of 
activism and impact in the neoliberal university’, Organization, Online First, 15 
December. 
Sardar, Z. (2000): Thomas Kuhn and the Science Wars, Postmodern Encounters Series, 
edited by Richard Appignanesi, Cambridge: Icon Books; 
Spicer, A., Alvesson, M. and Kärreman, D. (2009) ‘Critical performativity: The unfinished 
business of critical management studies’, Human Relations, 62(4): 537–560. 
Spicer, A., Alvesson, M. and Kärreman, D. (2016) ‘Extending critical performativity’, 
Human Relations, 69(2): 225–249. 
Stewart, J. (2016): What are the (C)HRD implications of Brexit? A personal reflection? 
Human Resource Development International, DOI: 10.1080/13678868.2017.1237420 
Stookey, S. (2008): The Future of Critical Management Studies: Populism and Elitism, 
Organization, 15(6): 922–924. 
Tatli, A. (2012): ‘On the Power and Poverty of Critical (Self) Reflection in Critical 
Management Studies: A Comment on Ford, Harding and Learmonth’, British Journal of 
Management, Vol. 23,, 22–30.  
 16 
Toly, N. (2016): Brexit, Global Cities, and the Future of World Order, Globalizations, DOI: 
10.1080/14747731.2016.1233679  
Wahl, P. (2016): Between Eurotopia and Nationalism: A Third Way for the Future of the 
EU, Globalizations, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2016.1228787  
Wickert, C. and Schaefer, S.M. (2015) ‘Towards a progressive understanding of 
performativity in critical management studies’, Human Relations, 68(1): 107–130 
Williams-Grut, O. (2016): Brexit and Trump are just the start — populism will strike 
Europe next, Business Insider, 10th November 2016. 
Worth, O. (2016): Reviving Hayek’s Dream, Globalizations, DOI: 
10.1080/14747731.2016.1228788  
Wright, B. (2016): There's a sinister strain of anti-intellectualism to Gove's dismissal of 
'experts', The Telegraph, 21 June 2016. 
Zakaria, F. (2016): Populism on the March: Why the West is in trouble, Foreign Affairs, 9 
2016: 9-15. 
 
i The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) is a professional UK association for 
human resource management professionals that ‘champions better work and working lives’ 
(www.cipd.co.uk). 
ii The Daily Mail is a daily middle market tabloid newspaper and is currently Britain’s second largest 
selling newspaper. Its editor is Paul Dacre and its political alignment is conservative. During the EU 
referendum campaign it was staunchly pro-leave with an emphasis on anti-immigration stories (see 
Martinson 2016) and as such is said to have had an influential effect on the voting patterns of its 
readership. 
                                                             
